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CHAPTER 18 
GOLD MINING AND 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE IN WEST AFRICA 
MICHAEL KEVANE 
18.1 INTRODUCTION 
THE history of gold mining in West Africa offers an important caveat to the aphorism that 
"geography is destiny:' The aphorism has considerable appeal. Through much of history 
the economic opportunities available in a geographic region shaped the social infrastruc-
ture of people who inhabited the region. The institutions of those who lived by the sea 
differed from those who roamed the desert. The truism is sometimes validated in empiri-
cal analysis: strong correlation across societies of two variables, one geographic and the 
other social, is interpreted as evidence consistent with a casual story. Alesina, Giuliano, 
and Nunn (2013), thus, found that regions more adaptable to plow-based agriculture 
developed social institutions unfavorable to women. Fenske (2012) found that regions 
exhibiting more ecological diversity were more likely to develop complex proto-state 
institutions. 
Research on historical and contemporary gold mining in West Africa, however, suggests 
a more nuanced story. The record suggests a variety of outcomes. There is also considerable 
room for mismeasurement of outcomes. The further back in time economic historians go, 
the more their stories, woven from sparse facts, become possibilities rather than certain-
ties. Asante and Mali, the two West African empires that were central to political and eco-
nomic dynamics in West Africa for centuries, may or may not have flourished because of 
gold. Given the highly unreliable statistics of contemporary West Africa, even in the pre-
sent there may be much disagreement over basic facts. Mali, Ghana and Burkina Faso, West 
Africa's leading gold exporters in the 2000-2013 period, may or may not be subject to the 
"resource curse:' Even at the local level, in both past and present, there has been little consen-
sus about how to characterize social institutions in mining regions. The crucible of gold min-
ing has not, apparently, been poured into a standard mold in which economies and societies 
were cast. 
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Gold mining in West Africa may be examined by considering two paradoxes. Regions 
with gold mines may have given rise to stronger and more complex state structures, 
while gold mining also gave rise to incentives for rent-seeking, conflict, and undermin-
ing of state structures. The revenues from taxation of gold mining were likely the pri-
mary mechanism for these effects. But another mechanism may have operated. Gold 
extraction and trade had to be organized through relatively complex social institutions. 
At the same time, participation in more complex social institutions changed interper-
sonal relationships and identities . In short, gold mining created manifold local economic 
and social changes that rippled through the broader economy and society. The nature of 
these changes and the extent of their impact on broader society, however, remain largely 
speculative. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes relevant research on the magni-
tudes of the gold mining sectors in West Africa from medieval times to the present. Section 3 
discusses the presumption that gold mining was directly implicated in early state formation 
in medieval times, and strengthened states in subsequent centuries. Section 4 reviews argu-
ments and evidence about how gold mining undermined state functioning. Section 5 briefly 
reviews work on the social impact of mining. Section 6 concludes by sketching a broad the-
ory of the place of gold mining in West Africa, while noting the severe limitations in the 
body of evidence available to evaluate the broad theory. 
18.2 GOLD MINING IN WEST AFRICA 
At various points in the economic history of West Africa, gold mining was quite exten-
sive and valuable, and therefore might have influenced social and economic institutions. 
Unfortunately, the historical and even contemporary record remains quite unsatisfactory. 
Historians have pieced together limited time-series of gold production levels for various 
gold producing areas. Even more uncertain are trends in the value of gold extracted in terms 
of purchasing power, the population involved in gold production, the forms of organization 
of production and trade, and the ties of gold-producing regions to state-like political forma-
tions. This economic history may be conveniently divided into five periods: (i) the medieval 
period, when gold from West Africa was a major source of bullion for the growing societies 
of the Mediterranean and Islamic world; (ii) the period 1700- 1850, when bullion exports 
from the New World, and shifting of commercial interests to the Atlantic slave trade, appear 
to have discouraged creation of recorded knowledge of gold mining in West Africa, either 
because all trade in gold became internal to West Africa and hence was a strictly oral affair, 
or because production levels fell dramatically so there was nothing worth recording; (iii) the 
late-18oos, when industrial mining techniques were introduced by European entrepreneurs; 
(iv) the colonial period proper, when colonial administrators organized and regulated gold 
extraction; and (v) the post-independence period, including especially the mining boom of 
the 2000S. 
Before discussing the magnitude of the gold sector in each period, a digression on pro-
duction techniques is in order. Gold ore has been excavated in several forms in West Africa. 
First are alluvial deposits of fairly concentrated gold that is embedded in rock. This gold is 
extracted by panning the shores of rivers, as the gold-bearing rocks are carried downstream 
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after seasonal rains. Dried up river-beds are also mined for these alluvial deposits. Second 
are relatively shallow deposits of quartz-bearing rock permeated with gold particles. This 
gold was extracted through tedious manual digging of pits, crushing of ore, admixture 
with mercury solutions, panning in water, and heating, concentration, and finally extrac-
tion. Since the early 1900s, open-pit mining using explosives, earth-movers, and industrial 
crushing of ore and industrial-scale leaching has been deployed. Artisanal gold mining per-
sists, however, because of the large capital expenditures involved in industrial mining and 
consequent risk. Finally, gold may be extracted in deep shaft mines, such as those common 
in South Africa. West Africa has seen few deep shaft mines. One is the Obuasi Gold Mine 
in Ghana owned by AngloGold Asante. Given relatively limited mining exploration in the 
region, there remain possibilities for large strikes deep underground. 
Gold in West Africa through the medieval era to the present has come from only a handful 
of regions, mostly located in a geological zone known as the Birimian greenstone belt. There 
have been open-pit, alluvial mines in Bambouk (also known as Bambuhu) near the Falame 
and Senegal rivers near the town of Kayes, and Boure, close to the present-day Guinea-Mali 
border near the town of Siguiri. These are the same regions where industrial and artisanal 
mining boomed in the 2000s in Mali. The Akan or Asante goldfields became known to early 
fifteenth-century Portuguese explorers, whose appellation for their first trading post and 
later castle, Elmina, referred to the mines. The region around the Tarkwa region to the west 
of Accra in the late 1800s developed large industrial mines. Goldfields in the Lobi area of 
south-western Burkina Faso near the border with Ghana may also have been significant in 
the medieval era. Since the rise in gold prices in the early 2000s, new geological exploration 
techniques have led to the discovery of numerous mining sites scattered throughout Burkina 
Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. 
18.2.1 Medieval period (1300-1700) 
The largest sources of gold in West Africa over the 1000-1700 period were Bambouk, Boure, 
and Akan (Gautier 1935; Malowist 1970). Estimates of the magnitudes of gold extracted and 
exported from these three regions in medieval and pre-colonial times are unreliable, given 
the paucity of documentary records. Moreover, units of measure varied across the different 
gold-trading posts on the trans-Saharan route. 
Bambouk and Boure were taxed and controlled (to some degree) by the medieval 
empire of Mali centered, for much of the period, in Nyeni (or Niani). Curtin (1983) sug-
gested that a figure of one ton per year exported across the Sahara was a reasonable edu-
cated guess for the magnitude of exports. Numerous anecdotes in the historical record 
can be triangulated to generate this approximate figure. Bambouk and Boure were the 
sources, for example, of Mansa Musa's apparently astonishing pilgrimage to Mecca 
in 1324, where he transported so much gold that the price on Cairo markets dropped 
markedly for years afterwards. Numismatic analysis of coins put into circulation in the 
Mediterranean world suggest that much of the gold currency of North Africa had its 
origin in African gold rather than central European gold (Messier 1974). Bambouk and 
Boure gold transported via trans-Saharan trade was clearly important in the monetiza-
tion of the Mediterranean basin, and the development of the Arab and Berber dynasties 
in the Maghreb region. 
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The Akan or Asante goldfields appear to have been of similar capacity as Bambouk and 
Boure. Curtin (1983) proposed that the first 100 years of the Portuguese monopoly over gold 
trading on the Atlantic side of West Africa, from 1500 to 1600, generated approximately half 
a ton per year of gold exports. 
Several authors have estimated that productivity from both the Mali and Asante gold 
fields was about one gram of gold per day per worker. There are about 28 grams in an ounce, 
so a person might have extracted an ounce each month. Thus one person extracted about six 
ounces during the six-month dry season when the alluvial fields could be worked. In order 
to have had a production level of approximately 30 ooo ounces (one ton), there would have 
had to have been approximately 5000 people working as active miners. If their households 
averaged five persons and the wife and children "supported" the miners (by growing food, 
trading, providing services, and other activities) then about 25 ooo persons would have been 
involved in each of the major gold fields. This would have been quite high population density 
by medieval standards. 
Some more arithmetic offers rough estimates of the value of taxing or controlling the gold 
extraction sites. Law (1991) reports that on the slave coast of West Africa around 1690 about 
1000 cowries traded for an acky, a sixteenth of an ounce of gold, and that 50 cowries was 
roughly consonant with subsistence expenditure (purchasing, for example, one chicken). In 
other words, an ounce of gold could purchase one more than a year's subsistence. If total 
extraction was on the order of 30 ooo ounces, the entity controlling the gold might then have 
had purchasing power equivalent to providing subsistence to 30 ooo people. Subtracting the 
subsistence for half a year of the 25 ooo people involved in the mining, that would still leave 
capital to remunerate at basic levels the services of approximately 17 500 persons. That is, 
control over a major gold site enabled a ruler to fund a well-sized army ( with its many retain-
ers) , by pre-colonial West African standards. 
18.2.2 Rise of the slave trade and New 
World bullion, 1700-1850 
Little is known of gold exports via the trans-Saharan routes for the 1700-1850 period. For the 
Asante goldfields, Curtin (1983) estimated that during the period from 1700 through 1850 
gold production and export was likely on the order of one ton per year. As the slave trade 
expanded and bullion increasingly was exported from the New World, records on trade in 
gold become increasingly scarce. Historians have been engaged in a lively controversy over 
the relative magnitudes of the value of the gold (and commodities more broadly) and slaves 
(Bean 1974; Eltis and Jennings 1988; Van Den Boogaart 1992). Given the controversy, perhaps 
the safe conclusion to draw is that slave and gold exports were of the same order of magni-
tude in value until the early 1800s when the slave trade was gradually abolished. 
18.2.3 The late-18oos 
Dumett (1998) remains one of the major sources for the Asante goldfields in the 1800s before 
colonial occupation. He found that relative to investments then taking place in the Americas 
the investments in Tawku (Tarkwa) in Ghana were quite modest, and that local African 
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entrepreneurs were often major figures in mining activity. Indeed, it appeared likely that 
African mining entrepreneurs were more successful than European ventures. The European 
ventures were overwhelming failures, and Dumett suggests that many of the backers of 
mining ventures were motivated by their ability to float shares in London and then loot the 
mining company. Despite their financial problems, Dumett argued that local and expatriate 
mining concessions in Tawku were not merely enclaves, with few ripples on local economic 
and political landscapes, but were rather quite significant in late nineteenth-century trans-
formations. In particular, he suggested that land tenure formalization and individualization 
in the region may have been more related to gold mining than cocoa. 
Other, apparently smaller, gold fields were known from pre-colonial times, but evidence 
on production has remained scarce. Kiethega (1983) argued that the gold mines of Poura in 
what is now south-western Burkina Faso were worked during late 1700s and through the 
mid-18oos. Output was relatively low: "At its height, the Poura industry may have produced 
between 5 and 50 kg of gold annuallf' Perinbam (1988) reviewed gold mining in the Lobi 
fields near the present-day Burkina Faso-Ghana border. There appears to be little evidence 
on the magnitudes of gold extracted, since trade was handled by a diaspora of Dioula mer-
chants. Presumably, the lack of evidence indicates that production levels were low. 
18.2.4 Colonial gold policy 
Military leaders, civilian administrators, and especially commercial interests of France and 
Britain were optimistic in their early assessments ofhow much gold there was in West Africa 
(Macdonald 1902). The British conquest of the Akan empire was accompanied by significant 
looting of gold wealth and also demands for reparations by the victors in the form of gold. 
The subsequent transfers were significant. 
Commercial gold production was limited in the Bambouk and Boure areas, while exten-
sive in the Akan region (Brunschwig 1975). A French company, Compagnie des Mines d'Or 
du Boure-Sieke et de l'Afrique Occidentale Fran«;:aise, issued shares in France in 1907, only a 
decade after the full conquest of the region. Yet it became clear even in the very beginning 
of the colonial period that the security, relative to earlier decades, of colonial rule raised the 
opportunity cost of labor. Local farmers and migrant labor had better opportunities, and 
commercial mining enterprises were unprofitable. As Curtin (1973) noted, "By a curious 
paradox, then, Bambuhu came to have a reputation for great wealth because it produced 
gold, but it produced gold because it was too poor to do anything else:' Once people in the 
area had other more lucrative opportunities for work, gold mining through artisanal meth-
ods was no longer profitable. Moreover, the infrastructure (roads and railroads, skilled tech-
nicians, and spare parts resupply) for industrial mining was absent. 
Gold production apparently halted in Upper Volta during the colonial period. Moussa 
(1995) argued that the pre-colonial mining areas of Poura and Gaoua never expanded 
beyond their production levels of (together) perhaps 100 kg per year. In Gaoua attempts 
to regulate and improve artisanal mining were eventually abandoned. In Poura an indus-
trial mine was established in mid-193os. But the mine appears not to have been profitable 
given the low ratio of gold in the ore, difficulties in obtaining spare parts, and relatively high 
wages for seasonal labor. In the artisanal sector, the French colonial administration pursued 
GOLD MINING AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN WEST AFRICA 345 
policies that were intended to extend colonial control and manage economic affairs, but had 
the result of stifling economic activity. The government established a purchasing monopoly 
on gold. Merchants had to obtain a formal license (patente) to purchase gold from miners, 
and the government fixed the price of gold. The interventions led, apparently, to even lower 
prices offered to gold miners, who quickly abandoned the arduous work. 
In the Gold Coast, the colonial administration eventually undertook significant infra-
structure investments to make the Tawku ridge accessible, and industrial mines became well 
established. Gold production in Ghana in the early 1930s, just before the Depression, was 
substantial: on the order of 250 ooo ounces in 1930 to 700 ooo ounces in 1939, which at real 
price of gold of US$500 per ounce would be $125-$350 million per year (United Kingdom 
1936, and other volumes). The gold exported was approximately 20% of the value of all 
exports from the colony. 
18.2.5 Post-independence period 
Gold mining policies in post-independence West Africa exemplify generally bad policy 
choices that undermined economic development across all sectors of post-independence 
economies. Newly independent authorities that might have used gold revenues to secure 
political power failed to invest in technology and organizational reform, and so gold min-
ing in West Africa was largely unprofitable and production declined dramatically. Mali and 
Ghana were both beset by political instability and military coups d'etat. Attempts by succes-
sive regimes to revive their gold sectors through state-led development ended in repeated 
failure. The state-owned Poura mine in Upper Volta (and then Burkina Faso) was closed in 
the mid-199os. 
In the 1980s, influence over economic policymaking shifted to the World Bank, as regimes 
depended on structural adjustment lending to ensure urban acquiescence to rule (by prop-
ping up civil servant hiring and salaries, and subsidizing essential urban commodities such 
as bread and petrol). The World Bank pushed for liberalization of the mining sector for West 
Africa. Most countries adopted new mining codes that were favorable to mining compa-
nies, with royalty rates around 3% and generous relief from taxation for the initial years of 
production. 
As a result of the reforms, industrial mining was reinvigorated in a number of countries. 
One country that experienced an early reindustrialization was Guinea in the mid-199os, 
particularly in Siguiri (the site of the medieval gold site of Boure). By the late 2000s, four 
companies had made significant investments: AngloGold Asante, Societe Miniere de 
Dinguiraye, Kenon, and Golden Rule Limited. The mines started producing 10- 20 tons per 
year. Mali likewise saw significant mining investment. In Ghana, mines reopened and sev-
eral new mines were established. 
The remarkable quintupling of the world price of gold from US$350 an ounce in 2000 
to above $1500 an ounce in 2012 spurred significant exploration and then investment. In 
Burkina Faso, for example, eight industrial mines opened by the end of the 2000s, and pro-
duction reached 30 tons per year in 2012. Production in Ghana exceeded 80 tons in 2011. 
Gold mining became one of the largest single sources of government revenue for Mali, 
Burkina Faso, and Ghana, surpassing revenue from cotton production and other agricultural 
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activities. Artisanal mining activities in the 2000s boomed and in many countries it has 
involved hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom had migrated away from their 
home villages. Young children have been extensively involved (Thorsen 2012). 
18.3 GOLD MINING AND STATE FORMATION 
A common understanding of state formation in the pre-modern era is to suppose that state 
structures emerged with social differentiation (Boix 2010). By differentiation is usually 
meant the process by which specialization and division oflabor enable people to pursue dif-
ferent trades, and accumulate greater wealth. Positive and negative implications of differen-
tiation favored state formation. On the positive side, differentiation implied greater returns 
to specialization and trade. A more complex trading economy benefitted from contract 
enforcement, a public good. On the negative side, organized looting increasingly became an 
enduring strategy for some social groups. The attractiveness oflooting may have been due to 
technological innovations: effective offensive raiding may have improved; wealth available 
to be looted may have increased; stationarity and identification of wealth may have increased 
as fixed capital became more important in production (Mayshar, Moav, and Neeman 2011). 
State formation then emerged as an equilibrium from the interaction of offensive groups and 
defensive groups, and from groups mutually benefitting from contract enforcement. Indeed, 
encouraging groups to refrain from looting and abstain from cheating may be seen as similar 
prisoner dilemma-type social problems. Lineage groups presumably evaluated the advan-
tages of a larger and more hierarchical armed force and dispute resolution mechanism. The 
evaluation presumably was akin to a choice over loyalty or exit. Africanist historians have 
been clear that in West Africa rulers competed for followers, rather than territory. Members 
of lineage groups were choosing to be loyal to an established polity. Over time, loyalty was 
institutionalized into a broader naturalization: the kingdom, sultanate or state came to 
occupy a legitimate and tolerated position at the top of the social order. 
The more homogenous a region, the fewer incentives for raiding and fewer gains from 
trade, and consequently less need for defense and judiciary, and so the less likely a state 
would emerge. Early states may have been more like clubs that organized trade or raiding, 
and the provision of generalized security, justice, and exaltation of the divine-the ideolo-
gies of states-were emergent properties of the growing complexity of organized violence. 
This common sense theorizing suggests that local potentates who controlled goldfields 
or gold trade routes may have leveraged resources to expand territory and influence while 
increasing the complexity and depth of political hierarchy. Thus the early rulers of the 
Bambouk and Boure goldfields may have been able to expand and sustain their control 
over large swathes of West Africa. It is taken as a commonplace that the early kingdoms of 
Adanse, Denkyira, and Asante arose because of gold (Ofosu-Mensah 2010). Girard (1992) 
argued, likewise, that trade routes delivering Bambouk gold to seaports in Senegal were a key 
factor in the rise of the small state of Cantor that eventually became the Mali empire's prov-
ince ofKaabu and later became an independent kingdom from 1500 to 1800. 
There are reasons to doubt the centrality of gold mining in state formation. First, the 
correlation of gold mining in Bambouk, Boure, and Akan and early state formation may 
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be entirely spurious. Other forces such as the slave trade and the commercialization of the 
Atlantic coast were at work. For example, there was considerable potential wealth from 
exporting commodities through the Saharan trade routes (salt and slaves) and the new 
Atlantic trade routes opened by the Portuguese in the early 1500s. The concomitant urbani-
zation around new Atlantic ports may have induced more centralized polities (Daaku 1970). 
In Sahelian West Africa Islamic-oriented jihads were emblematic of patterns of offensive and 
defensive warfare that may have eventually and indirectly given rise to state formations as 
in Europe (Tilly 1992). Finally, especially for Asante, the flood of technological innovations 
from the Atlantic trade (including new currencies, guns, new ships, and crops) was likely to 
have influenced incentives for state centralization. 
For the medieval period, gold extraction may have contributed to state formation indi-
rectly, through a mechanism quite different from state control of revenues and economic 
differentiation from growing wealth. Gold extraction during the medieval period enabled 
larger-scale trade with Europe, the Middle East, and India. One perhaps unanticipated 
byproduct of gold exports was the ability to import cowries on a much larger scale. The sub-
sequent spread of cowrie as low denomination currency possibly enabled the inland areas 
of the Niger bend to develop much more than they would have in the absence of wide-
spread currency. Currency permitted specialization. Monetization of economies through 
large-scale circulation of coinage may have been an important component of economic 
growth. Monetization enabled longer-distance trade, greater specialization (as craftsmen 
were less constrained by the double-coincidence of wants problem), and development of 
credit instruments that facilitated investment (because a standard unit of value was avail-
able) . Currency fostered growth that eventually led to a state, rather than the state fostering 
growth and eventually establishing a currency. 
Second, there is little evidence about how the apparent decline of gold extraction and 
exports in West Africa, and decline in the relative value of gold after the expansion of bul-
lion production in the New World, affected state formation and dissolution. In the sense, it is 
not clear how well the theory works "out of sample" as it were. Historical narratives that rely 
on causality going from the growth of gold to state formation eschew due consideration of 
the flip side. The gold sector experienced rapid and enduring declines. The discovery of bul-
lion resources in the Americas, especially silver, made the extraction of gold in West Africa 
practically unprofitable, and gold mining apparently declined precipitously in Mali after the 
1600s. If growth led to state formation, did decline not lead to state dissolution? The question 
has been relatively unexplored. Indeed, an unfortunate trend in recent economic history has 
been to compress the pre-colonial past of Africa into a single snapshot used to explain the 
present, with little attention to variation in the past (Austin 2008). 
Examination of the local-level issues of gold mining casts further doubt on the common-
sense notion that mining may have given rise to robust states. Historical and anthropologi-
cal accounts suggest that different ethnic groups located in the regions of gold mines had 
very different responses to the new opportunity. Werthmann (2003), for example, reviewed 
how in southwestern Burkina Dagara and some other ethnic groups viewed the earnings 
form gold as "bitter money:' Indeed, the appellation has broad echoes to other societies, 
not just in Africa. Some ethnic groups have shared powerful aversions to certain forms 
of wealth creation (Luning 2009). Gold mining, associated by Dagara with the earth and 
ancestors, was viewed as uncontrollably polluting of self and society. Other ethnic groups 
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came, then, to occupy the space of opportunity created. The path from ethnic appropriation 
of wealth to strengthening of ethnic institutions, to eventually negotiating and challenging 
state structures, was conditioned importantly by initial cultural understanding. The geog-
raphy of gold, it turned out, may have mattered more for certain ethnic groups than for 
others. 
18.4 GOLD MINING AND STATE FUNCTIONING 
The "resource curse" literature argues that rapid mineral extraction opportunities in weak 
states would make more difficult the inclination to solidify state legitimacy and hence effec-
tive projection of power. The literature appeared to be confirmed by robust negative correla-
tions between the share of natural resources in exports and levels and growth of GDP per 
capita. The hypotheses were numerous, ranging from political economy to the macroeco-
nomics of the Dutch Disease (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006; Robinson, Torvik, and 
Verdier 2006; Ross 1999). Mineral rents were supposed to have induced violent contesta-
tion over control of the state. Rents may have perversely affected incentives in the broader 
economy, leading to longer-term stagnation. Rents may have undermined processes leading 
to inclusive governance. Moreover, a negative feedback mechanism may have operated, so 
that rent-dependent polities structured incentives towards more extraction and away from 
investment, especially investment in public goods. Skeptics have argued that there is no gen-
eral resource curse and that models tend to assume their conclusion (Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte 2008). Thus if resources are assumed to induce corruption rather than enable control 
of corruption, it is not surprising that models generate the result that more resources cause 
more corruption. 
While gold may have been at the origin of state formation in West Africa, it may also have 
been responsible for the persistence of ineffective provision of the public goods critical for 
development. There is little evidence on how gold revenues may have undermined govern-
ance in pre-colonial states. The argument is sometimes made, though, that the "curse" of 
gold was what weakened Denkyira, initially the more powerful protostate of the region, ena-
bling the eventual Asante conquest of 1701 (McCaskie 2007 ). 
There is also little consensus on whether the explosion of gold mining in West Africa over 
the 1995-2013 period has been associated with a resource curse. West Africa in general has 
been since independence characterized by weak states and weak modern civil society insti-
tutions. The weak national state emerged from colonial rule, mutated into the one-party 
state of the 1960s, and has evolved into myriad semi-authoritarian democracies with opaque 
and contestable political "rules of the game." Comparatively strong traditional and religious 
institutions, on the other hand, have largely accommodated themselves to remain outside 
or interact informally with state structures. With the exception of Casamance, and more 
recently of the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali, there have been no significant separatist 
movements, despite the multi-ethnic character of most countries. 
In this environment, gold mining revenues might generate considerable instability. Actors 
prompted by a voracity effect to reopen foundational bargaining over allocation of power 
risk an extended interregnum. It is tempting to think, for example, that the resurgence of 
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gold mining in Mali during the 2000s may have played an important role in the disinte-
gration of the central Malian state. Mining revenues had become the single largest source 
of revenue for the Malian state (on the order of USs500 million per year). In March 2012, 
President Amadou Toumani Toure and much of the political class abandoned the political 
"field" when a small unit in the military took control of the Presidential Palace in Koulouba. 
The interregnum that followed only ended through international intervention, creating a 
de facto protectorate. While this is a tempting story to tell, there is little evidentiary basis 
for it given the scarcity of in-depth research on nexus of gold mining and governance in 
West Africa in the 2000s. It does appear, however, that Guinea has had a similar prolonged 
interregnum as foundational constitutional bargains are renegotiated. Both countries' cen-
tral states have less legitimacy and less capacity than in the late 1990s. Ghana and Burkina 
Faso, on the other hand, appear to have had state legitimacy and capacity strengthened by 
the boom. 
Why has gold mining not strengthened modern civil society and thus generated a 
reinforcement of counterweight to the state? In all four gold-mining states, the chal-
lenge from and response by organized modern civil society has been minimal. The 
experience of transparency initiatives supported by the World Bank and other donors 
has been similar in all countries. The discourses civil society organizations evoke and 
advocate for are heavily conditioned by the semi-authoritarian regimes. Civil society 
organizations emphasize prostitution, environmental damage, and mine labor relations , 
and devote little effort to tracking the hundreds of millions of US dollars of revenue gen-
erated by mining operations. Organizations such as Revenue Watch and Publish What 
You Pay have had little impact, and when Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) reports are published there are brief mentions in the press but otherwise little 
genuine public debate emerges. During the interregnums there is relatively little evi-
dence that organized civil society regards the mining sector as a central lever for politi-
cal transformation. 
18.5 LOCAL SOCIAL CHANGE 
There have been more hopeful analysts suggesting that the mining sector might engen-
der a more vibrant civil society at the local level. Bryceson and Fisher (2014) noted the 
"democratizing tendencies" of artisanal mining. Their analysis, based on extensive field-
work and surveys of Tanzanian artisanal miners, is likely generalizable to West Africa. 
They argued that the sharp rise in incomes from mining had enabled hundreds of thou-
sands of relatively young men and women to become more civically engaged than they 
would have had they remained in their villages. Migration to mining areas likewise 
removed this same population from the gerontocratic and authoritarian structures of vil-
lage life, into a more complex, and often more free and participatory, social structure 
of the mining camp. Finally, mining camps often celebrated individuality and responsi-
bility in ways that contrasted sharply with traditional social norms. Perhaps democratic 
participation would benefit from a greater sense of identity as an individual in society. 
Artisanal mining centers have become complex communities of young people, loosely 
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subject to existing local social institutions, but more often creating idiosyncratic new 
social institutions. 
Not all social change has to wait for the young generation of mining workers to become 
civically engaged. Dell (2013) and Arnaldi di Balme and Lanzano (2013) offered detailed 
studies of the actual institutions of local governance that have emerged in artisanal mining 
areas in Mali and Burkina Faso, respectively. The weak national state had left the field oflocal 
politics open to political entrepreneurs, who proffered a range of state-like functions (from 
dispute resolution, to security, to insurance). The democratizing tendency of greater local 
governance may, however, turn into a tendency to place loyalty to local authority above loy-
alty to the national state; with concomitant danger of rapid descent into warlordism should 
the central state collapse (Reno 1997; Vinci 2007). 
Certainly gold mining is shaping social relations in ways that must be of similar mag-
nitude to the transformations brought about by extensive service in the colonial military. 
The retired tirailleurs and other servicemen brought transformed local politics, according to 
many accounts (Lawler 1990). 
There has been relatively little research, however, on these significant social changes. 
Anthropologists have noted other changes in, among other things, gender relations, social 
norms regarding wealth and consumption, aspirations for the future, participation in local 
and national civic life, and the willingness to undertake risks and invest for the future (Gratz 
2009; Werthmann 2008). Quantitative evidence on broad social change is scarcer. In a sig-
nificant first approach, Kotsadam and Tolonen (2013) examined the incidence of female 
wage work in communities located near mining areas. Using a comprehensive listing of all 
mining sites in Africa, they mapped the locations of mines opened or closed since 1975 onto 
communities surveyed in Demographic and Health Surveys. They used a difference-in-
difference estimation strategy to show that changes in mines affected proximate communi-
ties, compared with communities further away, before and after the opening or closing of the 
mine. Women were more likely to report wage employment and less likely to be working in 
the household. 
Whether, and how, these community changes will have systemic effects on broader social 
trends remains difficult to discern. Moreover, there is a tendency to use representations of 
social change in discourses concerning mining. An old trope, for example, is that artisanal 
(and even industrial) mining communities are places where promiscuous sexuality and 
prostitution are prevalent (Werthmann 2009). This moralizing characterization appears to 
have been deployed when national elites sense that their control over mining might be jeop-
ardized by nascent local involvement in mining jurisdictions. Thus, the social change itself 
becomes part of discursive strategies that undermine nascent movement to challenge estab-
lished orders. 
18.6 CONCLUSION 
A comprehensive, empirically grounded history of gold mining in West Africa would trace 
how the economic and social ripples emanating from the local level affect the complex, 
state-level tension between the impetus and possibility of greater state efficacy as mining 
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revenues grow, with the weakening of central institutions as opportunities for rent-seeking 
and rebellion improve. Such a narrative would go beyond a simply theory of oscillation, 
where gold discoveries, high gold prices, and improvements in extraction technology 
lead to rents, and the rents enable temporary accumulation, but that accumulation leads 
to a voracity effects that undermines prosperity and institutional stability (Tornell and 
Lane 1999). 
A more micro-sociological account would emphasize how highly contingent initial con-
ditions shape the effects of gold mining. It would trace through the effects of gold mining on 
nascent social movements and transformations. Then these local emergent changes would 
be integrated into a larger-scale national and international model of political and economic 
outcomes. 
Such a narrative remains to be written. As scholars continue to uncover new sources 
and especially new methods of analysis, it is worth recalling that good unifying narratives 
of economic change (or lack thereof) should not see the historical process in straightfor-
ward terms. Instead, historical understanding is of contingent hesitations, with much 
variation and nuance, characterized by modesty given difficulties in falsifying grand nar-
ratives. Moreover, it is worth recalling that a standard critique of statistical confirmation of 
grand narratives is that they often are influenced by a version of positive significance bias 
(Austin 2008). That is, contingent patterns that have emerged from data are elevated to sta-
tus of grand narrative, despite a lack of true statistical significance (because the data have 
been "mined"), robustness (because checks on alternative specifications and data stop after 
a handful confirm the initial result), and external validity (because in history the problem 
addressed is often unique to a region or epoch). These appeals to virtue are an indirect way of 
concluding: perhaps social scientists and historian will never know the contours of the mold 
into which gold was cast. 
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